Amos
Fiat (fiat@tau.ac.il)
2nd Semester, 2013/14 - Tuesday 1600-1900.
See
latest version of book by Jason Hartline here.
See
book by Anna Karlin and Yuval Peres here.
Presentations:
·
Lectures 1-2: Arrows Theorem,
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Quasi Linearity, VCG
·
Lecture 3: Bayes Nash
Implementation
·
Lecture 4: Unit Demand Bidders,
Bayesian Approximation, Prophet Inequality
See
talks by Jason Hartline
at the Carnegie Mellon summer school on algorithmic economics here.
In
fact, you should listen to all 27 hours of talks
at the summer school.
Most
relevant to auctions are the (multiple) talks by Jason Hartline, Costas Daskalakis, and Eva Tardos, but
hear them all.
Template
for scribe notes here.
Papers:
Price of Anarchy for
Auction Revenue
Jason Hartline Darrell Hoy Sam Taggart
Bayesian
Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Jason D. Hartline,
Brendan Lucier
Bayesian Incentive
Compatibility via Matchings
Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Azarakhsh Malekian
Extreme-Value
Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing
Yang Cai,
Connstantinos Daskalakis
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism
Design
Hu
Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian
Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis
Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item
Auctions
Yang
Cai, Zhiyi
Huang
Sequential Auctions and Externalities
Renato
Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
Composable and Efficient
Mechanisms
Vasilis Syrgkanis,
Éva Tardos
Vasilis Syrgkanis,
Éva Tardos
Optimal Multi-Dimensional
Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
Yang
Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
The Complexity
of Optimal Mechanism Design
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum,
Christos Tzamos
Understanding Incentives:
Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design
Yang
Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions
with Ordered Bidders
SAYAN
BHATTACHARYA, ELIAS KOUTSOUPIAS, JANARDHAN KULKARNI, STEFANO LEONARDI, TIM
ROUGHGARDEN, XIAOMING XU,
Ba