Foundation of Cryptography, Lecture 6 Interactive Proofs and Zero Knowledge

Iftach Haitner, Tel Aviv University

Tel Aviv University.

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Iftach Haitner (TAU)

Foundation of Cryptography

Part I

Interactive Proofs

Definition 1 (\mathcal{NP} **)**

 $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ iff \exists and poly-time algorithm V such that:

• $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}$ there exists $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$ s.t. V(x, w) = 1

• V(x, w) = 0 for every $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ and $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$

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A proof system

- Efficient verifier, efficient prover (given the witness)
- Soundness holds unconditionally

Protocols between efficient verifier and unbounded provers.

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Definition 2 (Interactive proof)

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Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\langle (\mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V})(x) \rangle_{\mathsf{V}} = 1] \geq 2/3.^{a}$

Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$, and any algorithm P^{*}

 $\Pr[\langle (\mathsf{P}^*,\mathsf{V})(x)\rangle_{\mathsf{V}}=1]\leq 1/3.$

IP is the class of languages that have interactive proofs.

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- We typically consider (and achieve) perfect completeness.
- Negligible "soundness error" achieved via repetition.
- Sometime we have efficient provers via "auxiliary input".
- Relaxation: *Computationally sound proofs* [also known as, *interactive arguments*]: soundness only guaranteed against efficient (PPT) provers.

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Section 1

Interactive Proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism

```
Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)
Graphs G_0 = ([m], E_0) and G_1 = ([m], E_1) are isomorphic, denoted G_0 \equiv G_1, if \exists \pi \in \Pi_m such that
(u, v) \in E_0 iff (\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1.
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 Π_m – the set of all permutations from [*m*] to [*m*]

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- Does $\mathcal{GNI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \not\equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$?

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- We will show a simple interactive proof for *GNI* Idea: Beer tasting...

Interactive proof for \mathcal{GNI}

Protocol 4 ((P, V))

Common input $G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1)$

1 V chooses $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\pi \leftarrow \prod_m$, and sends $\pi(E_b)$ to P.^a

2 P send **b'** to V (tries to set b' = b).

V accepts iff
$$b' = b$$
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 ${}^{a}\pi(E) = \{(\pi(u), \pi(v) \colon (u, v) \in E\}.$

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Claim 5

The above protocol is IP for \mathcal{GNI} , with perfect completeness and soundness error $\frac{1}{2}$.

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Hence,

 $G_0 \equiv G_1$: $\Pr[b' = b] \le \frac{1}{2}$.

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Hence,

 $\begin{aligned} G_0 &\equiv G_1: \ \Pr[b'=b] \leq \frac{1}{2}. \\ G_0 &\not\equiv G_1: \ \Pr[b'=b] = 1 \ (i.e., \ \text{P can, possibly inefficiently, extracted from} \\ &\pi(E_i)) \end{aligned}$

Part II

Zero knowledge Proofs

Where is Waldo?



Where is Waldo?



Question 6

Can you prove you know where Waldo is without revealing his location?

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The concept of zero knowledge

• Proving w/o revealing any addition information.

The concept of zero knowledge

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The concept of zero knowledge

- Proving w/o revealing any addition information.
- What does it mean?
 - Simulation paradigm.

Zero-knowledge proof

Definition 7 (zero-knowledge proofs)

An interactive proof (P, V) is computational zero-knowledge proof (CZK) for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$, if \forall PPT V*, \exists PPT S such that

 $\{\langle (\mathsf{P}(w(x)),\mathsf{V}^*)(x)\rangle_{\mathsf{V}^*}\}_{x\in\mathcal{L}}\approx_c \{\mathsf{S}(x)\}_{x\in\mathcal{L}}.$

for any function w with $w(x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$.

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- Auxiliary input...

Section 2

Zero-Knowledge Proof for Graph Isomorphism

\mathcal{ZK} Proof for Graph Isomorphism

Idea: route finding

ZK Proof for Graph Isomorphism

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Protocol 8 ((P, V))

Common input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

P's input: a permutation π over [*m*] such that $\pi(E_1) = E_0$.

- **1** P chooses $\pi' \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $\boldsymbol{E} = \pi'(\boldsymbol{E}_0)$ to V.
- **2** V sends $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to P.
- If b = 0, P sets $\pi'' = \pi'$, otherwise, it sends $\pi'' = \pi' \circ \pi$ to V.
- V accepts iff $\pi''(E_b) = E$.

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Claim 9

Protocol 8 is a SZK for GI, with perfect completeness and soundness $\frac{1}{2}$.

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- Soundness: If exist *j* ∈ {0,1} for which ∄π' ∈ Π_m with π'(E_j) = E, then V rejects w.p. at least ½.

Assuming V rejects w.p. less than $\frac{1}{2}$ and let π_0 and π_1 be the values guaranteed by the above observation (i.e., mapping E_0 and E_1 to E respectively).

Then $\pi_0^{-1}(\pi_1(E_1)) = \pi_0 \implies (\mathsf{G}_0,\mathsf{G}_1) \in \mathcal{GI}.$

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ZK: Idea – for (G₀, G₁) ∈ GI, it is easy to generate a random transcript for Steps 1–2, and to be able to open it with prob ¹/₂.

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Algorithm 10 (S)

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

Do x times:

- **1** Choose $b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\pi \leftarrow \prod_m$, and "send" $\pi(E_{b'})$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Let *b* be V*'s answer. If b = b', send π to V*, output V*'s output and halt. Otherwise, rewind V* to its initial step, and go to step 1.

Abort.

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Claim 11 implies that Protocol 8 is zero knowledge.

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Consider the following inefficient simulator:

Algorithm 12 (S')

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Input: x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1)).
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• Choose \pi \leftarrow \prod_m and send \boldsymbol{E} = \pi(\boldsymbol{E}_0) to V^*(\boldsymbol{x}).
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Let b be V*'s answer.

- W.p. $\frac{1}{2}$,
 - Find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$, and send it to V^{*}.
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Proof: ?

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Claim 15

 $\forall x \in \mathcal{GI}$ it holds that

 $(\mathsf{P},\mathsf{V}^*(x))\rangle_{\mathsf{V}^*} \equiv \mathsf{S}''(x).$

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2 $SD(S''(x), S'(x)) \le 2^{-|x|}$.

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2 $SD(S''(x), S'(x)) \le 2^{-|x|}$.

Consider a second inefficient simulator:

Algorithm 14 (S")

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

- Choose $\pi \leftarrow \prod_m$ and send $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
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Output V*'s output and halt.

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Proof: ? (1) is clear.

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- Negligible soundness error?

"Transcript simulation" might not suffice!

Let (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme and let $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$.

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Protocol 16 ((P,V))

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Common input: x \in \{0, 1\}^*
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P's input: w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)
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- **O** V chooses $(d, e) \leftarrow G(1^{|x|})$ and sends e to P
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 - The above protocol has perfect completeness and soundness.
 - Is it zero-knowledge?
 - It has "transcript simulator" (at least for honest verifiers): exits PPT S such that {⟨(P(w ∈ R_L(x)), V)(x)⟩_{trans}}x∈L ≈_c {S(x)}x∈L,

where trans stands for the transcript of the protocol (i.e., the messages exchange through the execution).

Section 3

Composition of Zero-Knowledge Proofs

• Sequential repetition?

- Sequential repetition?
- Parallel repetition?

Zero-knowledge proof, auxiliary input variant.

Definition 17 (zero-knowledge proofs, auxiliary input)

An interactive proof (P, V) is computational zero-knowledge proof (CZK) for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$, if \forall deterministic poly-time V*, \exists PPT S such that:^{*a*}

 $\{\langle (\mathsf{P}(w(x)), \mathsf{V}^*(z(x)))(x) \rangle_{\mathsf{V}^*}\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{\mathsf{S}(x, z(x))\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$

for any any *w* with $w(x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$ and any $z \colon \mathcal{L} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$.

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) — the above distributions are identically/statistically close.

^aLength of auxiliary input does not count for the running time.

Zero-knowledge proof, auxiliary input variant.

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
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1) The protocol for \mathcal{GI} we just saw, is also auxiliary-input \mathcal{SZK}

What about randomized verifiers?

• Auxiliary-input zero-knowledge is maintained under sequential repetition.

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 - Chess game
 - Signature game

Section 4

Black-box Zero Knowledge

Definition 18 (Black-box simulator)

(P, V) is CZK with black-box simulation for $L \in NP$, if \exists oracle-aided PPT S s.t.

 $\{\langle (\mathsf{P}(w(x)), \mathsf{V}^*(z(x)))(x) \rangle_{\mathsf{V}^*}\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{\mathsf{S}^{\mathsf{V}^*(x, z(x))}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$

for any deterministic polynomial-time V*, any *w* with $w(x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$ and any $z : \mathcal{L} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$.

Prefect and statistical variants are defined analogously.

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Prefect and statistical variants are defined analogously.

- "Most simulators" are black box
- Strictly weaker then general simulation!

Section 5

Zero-knowledge proofs for all NP



• Assuming that OWFs exists, we give a (black-box) \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL .

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\mathcal{CZK} for 3COL

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Definition 19 (3COL) $G = (M, E) \in 3$ COL, if $\exists \phi : M \mapsto [3]$ s.t. $\phi(u) \neq \phi(v)$ for every $(u, v) \in E$.

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We use <u>commitment schemes</u>.

The protocol

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Protocol 20 ((P, V))

Common input: Graph G = (M, E) with n = |G|

- P's input: a (valid) coloring ϕ of G
 - **1** P chooses $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_3$ and sets $\psi = \pi \circ \phi$
 - *∀v* ∈ *M*: P commits to ψ(v) using Com (with security parameter 1ⁿ). Let c_v and d_v be the resulting commitment and decommitment.
 - 3 V sends $e = (u, v) \leftarrow E$ to P
 - P sends $(d_u, \psi(u)), (d_v, \psi(v))$ to V
 - V verifies that
 - Both decommitments are valid,
 - **2** $\psi(u), \psi(v) \in [3]$, and

The above protocol is a CZK for 3COL, with perfect completeness and soundness 1/|E|.

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Completeness: Clear

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- Completeness: Clear
- Soundness: Let {c_v}_{v∈M} be the commitments resulting from an interaction of V with an arbitrary P*.

Define $\phi: M \mapsto [3]$ as follows:

 $\forall v \in M$: let $\phi(v)$ be the (single) value that it is possible to decommit c_v into (if not in [3], set $\phi(v) = 1$).

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If $G \notin 3COL$, then $\exists (u, v) \in E$ s.t. $\psi(u) = \psi(v)$.

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Hence, V rejects such x w.p. at least 1/|E|.

Proving \mathcal{ZK}

Fix a deterministic, non-aborting V* that gets no auxiliary input.

Proving \mathcal{ZK}

Fix a deterministic, non-aborting V* that gets no auxiliary input.

Algorithm 22 (S) Input: A graph G = (M, E) with n = |G|Do $n \cdot |E|$ times: Choose $e' = (u, v) \leftarrow E$.

- Set $\psi(u) \leftarrow [3]$, • Set $\psi(v) \leftarrow [3] \setminus \{\psi(u)\}$, and
- Set $\psi(w) = 1$ for $w \in M \setminus \{u, v\}$.
- **2** $\forall v \in M$: commit to $\psi(v)$ to V^{*} (resulting in c_v and d_v)

3 Let e be the edge sent by V*.

If e = e', send $(d_u, \psi(u)), (d_v, \psi(v))$ to V^{*}, output V^{*}'s output and halt.

Otherwise, rewind V^* to its initial step, and go to step 1.

Abort.

Algorithm 23 (\tilde{S})

Input: G = (V, E) with n = |G|, and a (valid) coloring ϕ of G.

Do for $n \cdot |E|$ times:

• Choose $e' \leftarrow E$.

2 Act like the honest prover does given private input ϕ .

- 3 Let *e* be the edge sent by V^{*}. If e = e'
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Claim 24

 $\{ \langle (\mathsf{P}(w(x)), \mathsf{V}^*)(x) \rangle_{\mathsf{V}^*} \}_{x \in 3\text{COL}} \approx \{ \widetilde{\mathsf{S}}^{\mathsf{V}^*(x)}(x, w(x)) \}_{x \in 3\text{COL}},$ for any *w* with $w(x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$.

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Proof: ?

Claim 25

 $\{\mathsf{S}^{\mathsf{V}^*(x)}(x)\}_{x\in 3\mathrm{COL}}\approx_c \{\widetilde{\mathsf{S}}^{\mathsf{V}^*(x)}(x,w(x))\}_{x\in 3\mathrm{COL}}, \text{ for any } w \text{ with } w(x)\in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x).$

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Proof: Assume \exists PPT D, $p \in \text{poly}$, $w(x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$ and an infinite set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq 3\text{COL}$ s.t.

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{D}(\mathsf{S}^{\mathsf{V}^*(x)}(x)) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{D}(\widetilde{\mathsf{S}}^{\mathsf{V}^*(x)}(x, w(x))) = 1\right] \ge \frac{1}{\rho(|x|)}$$

for all $x \in \mathcal{I}$.

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for all $x \in \mathcal{I}$.

Hence, $\exists PPT \mathbb{R}^*$ and $b \in [3] \setminus \{1\}$ such that

$$\Pr\left[\left\langle \left(\operatorname{Snd}(1), \operatorname{R}^{*}(x, w(x))\right)(1^{|x|}\right)\right\rangle_{\operatorname{R}^{*}} 1\right] - \Pr\left[\left\langle \left(\operatorname{Snd}(b), \operatorname{R}^{*}(x, w(x))\right)(1^{|x|}\right)\right\rangle_{\operatorname{R}^{*}} 1\right]$$
$$\geq \frac{1}{|x|^{2} \cdot \rho(|x|)}$$

for all $x \in \mathcal{I}$.

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 $\{S^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x\in 3COL}\approx_c \{\widetilde{S}^{V^*(x)}(x,w(x))\}_{x\in 3COL}, \text{ for any } w \text{ with } w(x)\in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)..$

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In contradiction to the (non-uniform) security of Com.

Iftach Haitner (TAU)

Foundation of Cryptography

Remarks

Aborting verifiers

Remarks

- Aborting verifiers
- Auxiliary inputs

Remarks

- Aborting verifiers
- Auxiliary inputs
- Soundness amplification

For $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$, let Map_X and Map_W be two poly-time computable functions s.t.

- $x \in \mathcal{L} \iff \operatorname{Map}_X(x) \in \operatorname{3COL}$,
- $(x, w) \in R_{\mathcal{L}} \iff \operatorname{Map}_{W}(x, w) \in R_{\operatorname{3COL}}(\operatorname{Map}_{X}(x)).$

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We assume for simplicity that Map_{χ} is injective.

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```
Let (P, V) be a CZK for 3COL.
```

Protocol 26 ((P_L, V_L))

```
Common input: x \in \{0, 1\}^*.
```

```
\mathsf{P}_{\mathcal{L}}'s input: w \in \mathsf{R}_{\mathcal{L}}(x).
```

```
• The two parties interact in (P(Map_W(x, w)), V)(Map_X(x)),
```

where $P_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $V_{\mathcal{L}}$ taking the role of P and V respectively.

2 $V_{\mathcal{L}}$ accepts iff V accepts in the above execution.

• Completeness and soundness: Clear.

Claim 27 $(P_{\mathcal{L}}, V_{\mathcal{L}})$ is a CZK for \mathcal{L} with the same completeness and soundness as (P, V) as for 3COL.

- Completeness and soundness: Clear.
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Claim 27 $(P_{\mathcal{L}}, V_{\mathcal{L}})$ is a CZK for \mathcal{L} with the same completeness and soundness as (P, V) as for 3COL.

- Completeness and soundness: Clear.
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On input (x, z_x) and verifier V^{*}, let S_L output S^{V^{*}(x, z_x)}(Map_X(x)).

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Claim 28

 $\{\langle (\mathsf{P}_{\mathcal{L}}(w(x)),\mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*(z(x)))(x)\rangle_{\mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*}\}_{x\in\mathcal{L}}\approx_c \{\mathsf{S}_{\mathcal{L}}^{\mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*(x,z(x))}(x)\}_{x\in\mathcal{L}} \quad \forall \; \mathsf{PPT}\; \mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \, w, \, z.$

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Proof:

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Proof: Assume $\{\langle (\mathsf{P}_{\mathcal{L}}(w(x)), \mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*(z(x))(x) \rangle_{\mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*} \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \not\approx_{c} \{\mathsf{S}_{\mathcal{L}}^{\mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*(x,z(x))}(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$

Claim 27 $(P_{\mathcal{L}}, V_{\mathcal{L}})$ is a CZK for \mathcal{L} with the same completeness and soundness as (P, V) as for 3COL.

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Proof: Assume $\{\langle (\mathsf{P}_{\mathcal{L}}(w(x)), \mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*(z(x))(x) \rangle_{\mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*} \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \not\approx_c \{\mathsf{S}_{\mathcal{L}}^{\mathsf{V}_{\mathcal{L}}^*(x,z(x))}(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$

Hence,

 $\{ \langle (\mathsf{P}(\mathsf{Map}_{W}(x, w(x))), \mathsf{V}^{*})(x) \rangle_{\mathsf{V}^{*}(z'(x))} \}_{x \in 3\mathsf{COL}} \approx_{c} \{ \mathsf{S}^{\mathsf{V}^{*}(x, z'(x))}(x) \}_{x \in 3\mathsf{COL}},$ where $\mathsf{V}^{*}(x, z'_{x} = (z_{x}, x^{-1}))$ acts like $\mathsf{V}^{*}_{\mathcal{L}}(x^{-1}, z_{x})$, and $z'(x) = (z(x^{-1}), x^{-1})$ for $x^{-1} = \mathsf{Map}_{X}^{-1}(x)$.